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Emily Diana Michael Kearns Seth Neel Aaron Roth
Abstract
We consider a fundamental dynamic allocation problemmotivated by the problem
of securities lending in financial markets, the mechanism underlying the short sell-
ing of stocks. A lender would like to distribute a finite number of identical copies
of some scarce resource to n clients, each of whom has a private demand that
is unknown to the lender. The lender would like to maximize the usage of the
resource — avoiding allocating more to a client than her true demand — but is
constrained to sell the resource at a pre-specified price per unit, and thus can-
not use prices to incentivize truthful reporting. We first show that the Bayesian
optimal algorithm for the one-shot problem — which maximizes the resource’s
expected usage according to the posterior expectation of demand, given reports
— actually incentivizes truthful reporting as a dominant strategy. Because true
demands in the securities lending problem are often sensitive information that the
client would like to hide from competitors, we then consider the problem under
the additional desideratum of (joint) differential privacy. We give an algorithm,
based on simple dynamics for computing market equilibria, that is simultaneously
private, approximately optimal, and approximately dominant-strategy truthful. Fi-
nally, we leverage this private algorithm to construct an approximately truthful,
optimal mechanism for the extensive form multi-round auction where the lender
does not have access to the true joint distributions between clients’ requests and
demands.
1 Introduction
In this work, we consider the allocation of a scarce commodity in settings in which privacy concerns
or demand uncertainty may be in conflict with truthful reporting. In our model, some number of
clients request desired amounts of the commodity; these requests may or may not truthfully reflect
a client’s actual demand. Upon receiving the requests, a centralized allocator must decide upon
a distribution of the available supply and only later learns a (possibly censored) report of the true
demands. The allocator must charge a fixed fee per unit that does not vary across clients, and thus
prices cannot be used as a tool to enforce truthfulness, as is standard in mechanism design.
The primary motivation for this particular framework is the problem of securities lending (or “stock
loan”) in financial markets [Wik19, Rot14, Pic17]. In order to take a short (negative) position in
a publicly traded company, an investor (typically a professional entity such as a hedge fund, asset
manager or mutual fund) must temporarily borrow shares from a party that actually owns them
(typically a brokerage). The investor then immediately sells (or “shorts”) the shares at the current
market price; in the event of a successful short, the price subsequently declines, and the investor
buys back the shares at the lower price, pays off the stock loan (in shares), and profits from the
difference.
In this problem, the clients are the investors desiring to short a particular stock, and the allocator is
typically a brokerage firm that lends on a flat per-share fee basis [Che19, Wik19]. More complex fee
structures, including differential or volume-based pricing, are discouraged due to their complexity
and to the presence of competing flat-fee brokerages. The commodity is the shares to loan; it is
scarce because the brokerage has a limited supply, and demand can be high for stocks that have a
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great deal of “short interest” and are therefore known as “hard to borrow.”1 In general, the allocator
would like to maximize the number of loaned shares actually shorted (sold by clients in the market)
since the allocator is paid fees only on the shares shorted, not on those allocated but unused by
clients. In many markets there are severe penalties to the allocator for lending out more shares than
they hold [Ys18] (known as a “naked short”[Wik19]), so overallocation is not an option.
Clients generally wish to be allocated their true demands. But, there are natural reasons why clients
may choose not to, or be unable to, truthfully request their true demands. It is often the case that
a client may request shares in the morning anticipating a trade, but their exact demand (possibly as
determined by an algorithm that assesses daily market conditions) might not be decided until later in
the day. Or, as with many financial market settings, clients may also have distinct privacy concerns.
In particular, sophisticated clients such as quantitative hedge funds may worry that a truthful request
for a large loan— such as a million shares of Tesla—will leak the client’s view, signal, or intentions
regarding Tesla to the broader market, thus compromising the client’s ability to profit from the short
trade or revealing proprietary information the client may possess. 2 It is therefore not uncommon
for clients to deliberately over-request across all securities in an effort to hide their true demands,
especially if there is no penalty or disincentive for such untruthful requests.
In this work, we formalize the setting above and show the following results:
• Assuming knowledge of the client’s joint distributions over true demands and requests, we
derive the optimal allocation rule. This result is a generalization of the optimal solution
for an unrelated but structurally similar allocation problem in financial markets known as
order routing in dark pools [GKNV09] (Theorem 1).
• We then show that for any client whose utility depends only on maximizing shares received
up to her true demand, and not on any privacy considerations, truthfulness is a dominant
strategy under the optimal allocation rule in a model in which clients must commit to a
joint distribution on demands and reports, which the mechanism is assumed to know. Thus,
such clients can safely request their true demands regardless of the behavior of others (The-
orem 2).
• We then turn to privacy considerations. Rather than attempting to encode privacy explicitly
into client utilities, which would result in a brittle model, we instead prefer the reduced-
form approach of joint differential privacy (JDP), which provides protection against any
privacy-related concerns of clients, including those permitting collusion by other clients.3
We show how the optimal allocation policy can be implemented as a virtual ascending
auction among clients, which is amenable to private implementation. The resulting algo-
rithm provides near-optimal allocations for the allocator, while offering clients a solution in
which truthfulness is an approximately dominant strategy and privacy is guaranteed (Theo-
rems 4, 5).
• Finally we show that we can leverage our private ascending auction to construct an ap-
proximately truthful mechanism, which is approximately optimal given that clients report
truthfully, for the significantly more general setting in which clients choose their reports
sequentially in an arbitrarily long (or infinite) horizon extensive form game, the mecha-
nism is not assumed to know the joint distribution on client demands and reports — and in
fact, the clients are not restricted to playing from any such static distribution. (Theorems 6,
7). It turns out that the privacy property of our mechanism is exactly what guarantees ap-
proximate dominant-strategy truthfulness in this more general setting, which is unusual:
generally multi-round auctions cannot be shown to be dominant-strategy truthful because
of the potential for bidders to threaten one another.
1.1 Related Work
The work that is most closely related to our first set of results is the aforementioned paper on order
routing in dark pools [GKNV09]. While motivated by a rather different trading problem, from our
1Indeed, financial analysts often use a large number of shares on loan as a negative indicator of market
sentiment around a public company, and hard-to-borrow tables are a valued source of such information [Jou18].
2There is indeed evidence that short trades carry information about future prices [LJ17, SY17, BW13].
3See e.g. [GR15] for a discussion of how the guarantees of differential privacy can be used to upper bound
future costs resulting from information disclosure, without the need to model the specifics of the utility function.
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perspective, their model can be viewed as the simplification of our setting in which clients have
unknown true demands but do not have the opportunity to first provide a request or report to the
allocator. The focus of [GKNV09] is on the problem of efficiently learning the optimal allocation
from censored observations. In contrast, the presence of requests in our model makes incentive,
truthfulness, and privacy considerations most salient, which is our primary focus.
In the latter part of the paper, we build on a line of work using (variants of) differential privacy in
the context of mechanism design. Joint differential privacy — the variant we use — was introduced
by [KPRU14] as a tool for mechanism and mediator design in large games. The most crucially re-
lated paper is [HHR+14], which gives jointly differentially private algorithms for solving allocation
problems closely related to the one we solve in this paper. In fact, by reformulating our problem as
an allocation problem, we can show that it fits under the setting of [HHR+14], in that our valuation
functions satisfy what is called the gross substitutes property. As such, we can use their Algorithm
3 to compute an approximately optimal allocation subject to JDP. We give a slightly different, but
technically similar private auction algorithm to theirs. Moreover, [HHR+14] show how to make
their allocations approximately dominant-strategy truthful if prices can be charged as a function of
the allocation. In our setting, we cannot set prices as a function of the allocation, so we need to
prove dominant-strategy truthfulness of our private auction from first principles.
2 Model
We now formalize our allocation problem and give the necessary privacy definitions.
2.1 Definitions
Basic Model: We model an interaction between clients and a lender using a mechanism A, over
some fixed time horizon T . Let i ∈ {1, . . . , N} index clients. At each round t each client i has
some private non-negative usage uit ≤ U drawn from a usage distribution Ui. The client submits a
request for rit shares to borrow. The requests rit are observed directly by the lender, who will use
them to choose an allocation of shares St = {sit}, subject to a feasibility constraint that not more
than V shares are offered in total:
∑
i sit ≤ V .
The client’s usage uit is the maximum number of shares she intends to use. A client who is allocated
sit shares obtains a payoff equal to the number of shares she actually uses: vi(St) = min(sit, uit).
(In fact, all of our results generalize to arbitrary bounded utility functions that are monotone
increasing on sit ≤ uit.) The clients may choose any arbitrary mapping from true intended usages
uit to distributions over reports rit, and we do not restrict how it varies round-to-round. Note that
when we analyze strategic considerations, we will regard the true demand distribution Ui as beyond
client i’s control, but the choice of the mapping uit → rit is strategic. By this we mean that any
attempt by client i to “game" the lender comes by way of altering her requests and not by extending
her usage beyond her true demand.
Since the request can be a randomized function of uit, we denote the conditional request distribution
byQit(rit|uit). At time t define the historyHt as the observed requests, allocations, and executions
for each client i over times l = 1 . . . t − 1, e.g. Ht = (rit, sit, vi(St))n,Ti=1,t=1, where again
vi(St) = min(sit, uit) is the number of shares executed by client i at time t. Denote the set of all
possible histories up to time t byHt and the subset of the history corresponding to client i byHit .
An allocation mechanismA maps the requests rt = (rit) at time t and the historyHt to allocations
of shares: A(r1t, . . . , rnt;Ht) = St. An allocation rule A is a one-shot algorithm that maps a
set of requests (rit) and conditional distributions Qit(·|uit) on rit to an allocation St. Importantly
an allocation rule not only observes the requests but also has full knowledge of the conditional
distributions they were drawn from. Although an allocation mechanism captures our setting of
interest, allocation rules are the primary object of interest in this paper. This is because we will
show that an optimal allocation mechanism has the following structure: givenHt and requests rt, A
estimates the conditional distributions Qˆi(rit) as a function of Ht, where Qˆi(rit) approximates the
true conditionalQit(uit|rit). Then treating these estimated distributions as the true conditionals,A
3
uses an allocation rule A to compute the allocation that maximizes its expected utility with respect
to those conditional distributions A(Qˆ1(r1t), . . . Qˆt(rnt)).
We now define a strategy for a client with respect to an allocation rule, the client’s utility, the lender’s
utility, and joint differential privacy (JDP) of an allocation rule. We give the analogous definitions
for an allocation mechanism in Section 5.
A strategy for client i given true demand uit is defined by the choice of request distribution
Qit(rit|uit). Now fix a (possibly randomized) allocation rule A. At each round, given a set of
distributionsQ−it and reports r−it for the other clients and a realization of client i’s usage uit ∼ Ui
client i’s expected utility at round t as a function of her own choiceQit(rit|uit) is:
viA(Qit) = Erit∼Qit(·|uit)[vi(A(rit, r−it;Qit, Q−it))]
We say that A is dominant-strategy truthful if for all i, Q−it, r−it, uit client i’s utility function is
maximized by selecting the distribution Qit(rit|uit) that places all of its mass on the true demand:
i.e. Qit(rit|uit) = 1 if uit = rit, and Qit(rit|uit) = 0 otherwise. We will denote this distribution
by 1rit .
At each round the lender’s realized utility for an allocation S is the total number of shares executed:∑
imin(sit, uit). Hence upon receiving reports {rit} and distributions {Qit}, the lender’s expected
utility for a (possibly randomized) allocation rule A is:
v(A) =
∑
i
EQit,A[min(A(r1, . . . , rn;Q1, . . . , Qn)i, uit)]
We remark here that since the lender does not observe uit, but does observe the draw rit ∼ Qit, the
expectation is taken with respect to the posterior distribution on uit given the request rit. This is
different than the sum of the clients’ utilities, where the expectations condition on uit but are taken
over the random draw rit ∼ Qit.
Privacy: We view a dataset as being a collection of reports r ∈ Xn, where X is an arbitrary
abstract domain (in our case, instantiated as a set of distributionsQ together with real valued reported
demands).
Definition 1. Two datasets r, r′ ∈ Xn are i-neighbors if they differ in only the report of client i:
r−i = r′−i. We say that two datasets r, r
′ are neighbors if they are i neighbors for any i.
Differentially private computations enjoy closure under post-processing, as well as composition. We
defer the definition of standard differential privacy and the exact statements of these properties to
the Appendix. Differential privacy is a strong guarantee that limits what an arbitrary adversary can
infer about an individual even if the adversary can observe the entire output of the mechanism. In
the context of allocation problems, this guarantee is too strong. Informally, this is because a useful
mechanism must be able to non-trivially vary the allocation it gives to an agent i as a function
of i’s reported demand — see [HHR+14] for a formalization of this intuition. However, allocation
mechanisms have special structure, because not just their inputs, but also their outputs are partitioned
among n agents. Hence, it makes sense to consider adversaries who, when trying to make inferences
about agent i, can observe the allocation only to agents other than i. This is informally what joint
differential privacy protects against.
Definition 2 (Joint Differential Privacy [KPRU14]). A mechanism A : Xn → On is (ǫ, δ)-jointly
differentially private if for every i, every pair of i-neighboring datasets r, r′, and for every subset
S−i ⊂ On−1 of outputs corresponding to agents other than i:
Pr[A(r)−i ∈ S−i] ≤ exp(ǫ) Pr[A(r′)−i ∈ S−i] + δ
If δ = 0, we say A satisfies ǫ joint differential privacy (JDP).
Typically, to prove that an algorithm is jointly differentially private, we will first prove that a key
information structure that “coordinates” clients in a computation is differentially private, and then
apply the billboard lemma, which states that if a client’s allocation is purely a function of an ǫ-
differentially private computation and their own private data, the overall mechanism is ǫ-JDP. We
defer the precise statement to the Appendix.
In the next three sections we focus on an allocation rule at a fixed round t with knowledge of the
request distributionsQit, and so we drop the subscript t until Section 5.
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3 The Optimal Allocation Rule (Without Privacy Concerns)
3.1 Computing the Optimal Allocation
In this section, we give a simple greedy algorithm to compute the lender’s optimal allocation, given
knowledge of the true joint distributions Qi. In section 3.2 we show that the optimal allocation rule
is dominant-strategy truthful.
Upon observing reports ri from each client, and given knowledge ofQi, the lender can compute the
posterior distributionQi(ui|ri) on the true demand ui given ri, via Bayes’ rule:
Qi(ui|ri) = Qi(ri|ui)Ui(ui)∑
u′ Q(ri|u′)Ui(u′)
Then, we can rewrite the lender’s utility more explicitly as:
v(S) =
∑
i
Eui∼Qi(u|ri)[min(si, ui)] (1)
where S = A(r1, . . . , rn;Q1, . . . , Qn). We have dropped A from the expectation, because when
studying the optimization problem for fixed Qi, without loss of generality, we can restrict our atten-
tion to deterministic mechanisms.
We show that the simple greedy algorithm (inspired by an algorithm given in [GKNV09] for a
different problem) presented as Algorithm 1, computes the allocation S that exactly maximizes
v(S). The algorithm operates by sequentially assigning shares 1 . . . V , where each share is assigned
to the client i most likely to be able to utilize one additional share. “Most likely" is determined
according to the posterior distribution of client demand ui, conditioned on ri. Given Qi(u|ri) we
denote by Ti(s|ri) the tail probability Prui∼Q(u|ri)[u ≥ s] =
∑
s′≥sQi(s
′|ri).
Algorithm 1 Greedy Allocation Rule
1: Input: n, {Qi(ui|ri)}i∈[n], V
2: Output: feasible allocation S = {si}.
3: procedure GREEDY(n, {Qi(ui|ri)}i∈[n], V )
4: Initialize si = 0, ∀i. ⊲ number of shares allocated to client i
5: for t = 1 . . . V do
6: Let i∗ = argmaxiTi(si + 1|ri)
7: update si ← si + 1
8: end for
9: end procedure
Theorem 1. The allocation returned by Greedy maximizes the expected payoff for the lender: For
S the allocation output by greedy:
S ∈ arg max
S:
∑
i si=V
v(S) =
∑
i
EQi(u|ri)[min(si, ui)]
3.2 Dominant-Strategy Truthfulness
We now turn our attention to the strategic question: given that the lender is solving the allocation
problem optimally for the reportedQi distributions, using Algorithm 1, howwill the clients behave?
We show that truth telling is a dominant strategy. We note in passing that since Algorithm 1 is also
a best response for the lender, given fixed Qi distributions, this in particular means that there is a
Stackelberg equilibrium in which the clients move first, report their distributions truthfully, and then
the lender optimally best responds in mechanism space.
Theorem 2. Fix a set of choices Q−i and reports r−i for all clients other than i, and a realization
of client i’s usage ui ∼ Ui. Let QTi denote the truthful strategy QTi (ri|ui) = 1ri , and let Qi(ri|ui)
denote any other strategy. Let A denote the lender’s optimal allocation. Then:
viA(Qi) ≤ viA(QT )
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4 Auction Formulation
We first re-conceptualize the problem of computing the optimal allocation for the lender given known
distributions Qi as computing the social welfare maximizing allocation with respect to a set of
valuation functions for each client i. Using this formulation of the problem, we give an algorithm
(based on [SC82]) that uses an ascending price auction formulation to compute an approximately
optimal allocation. This formulation will naturally lend itself to computing the allocation in a way
that satisfies (joint) differential privacy, using techniques similar to those in [HHR+14].
4.1 Optimal Allocation
Consider a setting in which V identical units of a good are being sold to n bidders, each of whom
has an arbitrary decreasing marginal valuation function for up to U units of each good. We model
bidders as having quasi-linear utility for money and wish to find the welfare maximizing allocation.
We can map our problem onto this setting as follows: For each agent iwho requests ri shares and has
a posterior demand distributionQi(ui|ri), we define the valuation function for agent i as a function
of the number of units of the good they receive, as follows:
vi(s) =
1
U
Eu∼Qi(ui|ri)min(s, ui) =
s∑
j=1
Pru∼Qi(ui|ri)[u ≥ j]
Given an allocation S = (s1, . . . , sn) of V shares to n clients, we define the total social welfare
to be v(S) = 1V
∑
i vi(si). It is immediate that an allocation that maximizes the social welfare is
the optimal allocation from the perspective of the lender in our problem: it maximizes the expected
number of shares executed with respect to the posterior distributions on true demand. Since our
new ascending price auction will compute the approximately optimal allocation for a wider range of
allocation problems than the securities lending problem that is our main interest, we abstract away
the securities lending setting and state our results in full generality.
Suppose that we are in the general setting of allocating V identical copies of a good to n bidders,
each of whom possess a valuation function vi : [U ] → [0, 1], with the diminishing marginal returns
(DMR) property, defined below.
Definition 3. A valuation function vi is said to have the diminishing marginal returns property
(DMR) if for all s ≤ j ≤ U − 1:
vi(s+ 1)− vi(s) ≥ vi(j + 1)− vi(j)
Then the algorithm AUCTION (see Algorithm 3 in the Appendix) efficiently computes an approxi-
mately social welfare maximizing allocation for any such problem.
Theorem 3. AUCTION(V, α, U) terminates after at most Vα+1 rounds. At termination,S constitutes
an αVn -optimal allocation:
v(S) ≥ max
S′
v(S′)− αV
n
4.2 Private Auction
We modify AUCTION so that it will guarantee joint differential privacy, following the approach of
[HHR+14]. We will show that for sufficiently large auctions, e.g. n sufficiently large relative to V, ǫ,
we can achieve privacy while still outputting a high-quality allocation. Finally, we will show that
our private auction remains approximately dominant-strategy truthful. We give full pseudocode for
PRIVAUC in the Appendix.
At a high level, we modify AUCTION in a few ways in order to make it jointly differentially private:
1. The running count TB of the total number of bids placed so far will be computed approx-
imately using a differentially private estimator. Since the price at each round is computed
purely as a function of TB, the price trajectory will be differentially private as well.
2. Rather than terminating when B = 0, the algorithm will terminate when B < ρn (early
stopping). This will serve to limit the maximum number of times any single buyer can
place a bid, which will aid us in bounding the error of the differentially private bid count.
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3. Rather than running the auction with a supply of V shares, we will run the auction with a
supply of V − E shares, where E corresponds to the maximum error of our differentially
private bid counter; this ensures that our computed allocation (which now may over or
under allocate with respect to its target supply) is always feasible.
Through the run of PRIVAUC , each player computes her own allocation purely as a function of the
(private) trajectory of prices. As a result, the entire procedure will satisfy joint differential privacy
by Lemma 2.
We define the lender’s utility under the optimal (non-private) allocation of V shares by OPTV =
max{S:∑ si=V } v(S) = max{S:
∑
si=V }
1
V
∑
i vi(si). In the theorem statement to follow, ρ governs
the accuracy of the private allocation and is an input to PRIVAUC which defines the early stopping
criterion. Any fixed value of ρ specifies a range of instance parameters (n, V, α) for which the
accuracy theorem holds.
Theorem 4. 1. α(Vρ ) ≤ n ≤ 1α (Vρ )
2. n = Ω(
√
log(1/β) log(2V/αρ)5/2V
ǫαρ2 ) ⇔ n ≥ 8E/ρ
3. n = Ω( log(1/β) log(V/αρ)
5/2
ǫαρ2 ) ⇔ EV ≤ ρ/8
For α, β, ρ, n, V, ǫ such that (1), (2), (3) hold, PRIVAUC satisfies (ǫ, β)-JDP, and if S is the alloca-
tion returned by PRIVAUC, with probability 1− β:
v(S) ≥ (1 − ρ)OPTV − ρ
Theorem 4 tells us that for α sufficiently small, and for n = Ω(
√
V
ǫρ ), we are able to achieve (ǫ, β)-
JDP and near-optimal welfare.
PRIVAUC still incentivizes truthful reporting as an approximate dominant strategy for almost all
agents. As n grows, both approximations become perfect. Our proof of this crucially uses the
privacy of PRIVAUC.
Theorem 5. Let client i have true demand ui ∼ Qi(ui). Suppose she selects an arbitrary condi-
tional distribution Qi(r|ui) and draws ri ∼ Qi(r|ui), which in turn induces the lender’s posterior
Qi(u|ri). Let QT denote the truthful conditional distributionQT (r|ui) = 1{r = ui}. Let A denote
PRIVAUC. Then, for at least (1−√β + (1− β)ρ)n clients i,
viA(Q
T ) ≥ e−ǫviA(Qi)− e−ǫ
√
β + (1− β)ρ
1−√β + (1 − β)ρ
5 An Approximately Optimal Allocation Mechanism
5.1 Setting
Finally we show how PRIVAUC can be leveraged to give an approximately optimal mechanism in the
general setting where at each round each client i has the freedom to (adaptively) choose an arbitrary
mapping Lti : Hit × [U ] → [U ] that maps the realized history and demandHt, uit respectively, to a
request rit. We first give the relevant definitions for allocation mechanisms.
We define a strategy for client i as a set of randomizedmappingsLit : Hit×[U ]→ [U ] for t = 1 . . . T ,
that map the observed history for that clientHit and the demand uit at round t, to the request rit.
Given an allocation mechanismA, and a client i, the utility of client i is defined as:
viA(L
i
1, . . . , L
i
T ) =
T∑
t=1
E[vi(A(rit, r−it;Ht)],
where the expectation is taken over the randomness inA and over the Lti for all i, t. We say thatA is
dominant-strategy truthful if for all i, fixing the strategies at each round of all other clients (L−it )
T
t=1,
client i’s utility function is maximized by the truthful strategies Li∗t defined by:
Li∗t (Ht, uit) = uit for all uit ∈ [U ], Hit ∈ Hit, ∀t ∈ [T ].
7
The lender’s utility for an allocation mechanism is defined similarly to summing up the lender’s
utility for an allocation rule used at each round. However, since an allocation mechanism does not
know the true conditionals Qit(uit|rit) at each round and only observes the requests rit, the utility
for a mechanism is taken in expectation over the conditional uit|rit, Ht, rather than the posterior
Qit(uit|rit):
v(A) =
∑
t
∑
i
Euit∼Qit(uit|rit,Ht),A[min(A(r1, . . . , rn;Q1, . . . , Qn)i, uit)]
5.2 An Optimal Mechanism
Consider Greedy Mechanism and the Private Greedy Mechanism defined in the Appendix. Both
mechanisms estimate the posterior distribution Qit(uit|rit) by naively assuming the clients are
truthful, e.g. Qit(uit|rit) = 1rit . The Greedy Mechanism, which uses the greedy algorithm as
its allocation rule, is truthful when we assume that each client plays requests from the same fixed
distributionQi at each round or when the set of request distributions are determined non-adaptively.
This is easy to see because the distributions played by each client are fixed a priori at every round,
and by Theorem 2 each auction at each round is truthful.
It is not the case however, that the Greedy Mechanism is even approximately truthful when the
players have the ability to arbitrarily adapt their strategies over a series of rounds. Example 1 in the
Appendix demonstrates that truthfulness is violated because over multiple rounds adaptivity allows
clients to potentially coordinate their behavior. It turns out that in addition to providing privacy, JDP
is precisely the property that makes the general form of the allocation mechanism truthful when
clients are only concerned with maximizing their own utilities, by limiting the ability of client’s
requests to influence the requests of another client (and thereby coordinate) across rounds.
Theorem 6 (Approximate Truthfulness). Let A be the allocation rule PRIVAUC(α,U, V, ǫ, ρ) such
thatA is (ǫ′, β/T )-JDP with ǫ′ = O˜(ǫ/
√
T ) and outputs S such that E[V (S)] ≥ (1−ρ)OPTV −ρ.
Take β, ρ such that
√
β + (1 − β)ρ ≤ β2/T . Then for a (1 − β) fraction of the n clients i:
Let Lti∗ denote the truthful strategies, and let L
t
i be any other set of strategies. Algorithm 0 with
allocation rule PRIVAUC satisfies:
vi(L
1
i , . . . , L
n
i ) ≤ e2ǫvi(L1i∗, . . . , Lni∗) + 2βUT + eǫ
β2
1− β2/T
We note that ǫ′ is set to ensure (ǫ, β)-privacy after T rounds of composition using the advanced
composition theorem of [DRV10]. Now conditional on all clients i requesting truthfully at all rounds
t, the Private Greedy Mechanism consists of T runs of PRIVAUC with input distributionsQi = 1rit ,
the true posterior on uit = rit. Hence with the same settings as Theorem 6:
Theorem 7.
vA(Lti∗) ≥ (1− ρ)OPTV − ρT,
where OPTV denotes the lender’s optimal utility.
Remark 1 (Learning). The only drawback to our Private Greedy Mechanism is that the learning
component in step 8 is trivial; it only learns correctly when clients are truthful. While this is enough
to incentivize truthfulness, it would fail if clients were instead to play from a fixed (dishonest) distri-
bution Qit = Qi. A more practical algorithm would try to learn the distributions while preserving
truthfulness, and by learning that the distributions obtain approximately optimal utility for the lender
against arbitrary input distributions Qi. The only property the learning step 8 has that was used to
establish the above results, is that if clients do report truthfully at every round, the posterior on uit
should be 1uit for all i, t. Consider the naive learning algorithm that for each arm i for a period of
T rounds assigns all the shares (up toU the maximum demand) to arm i and observes an uncensored
observation ui. After drawing enough samples to estimate each conditionalQi(u|ri) for each client
i and each possible request, the algorithm computes the optimal allocation with respect to these esti-
mates using Greedy. This algorithm clearly has the desired property, and in the Appendix we sketch
a proof via standard concentration arguments that in polynomially many rounds we can estimate the
conditional distributions Qi(u|ri) well enough to allocate approximately optimally using Greedy.
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Algorithm 2 Securities Lending Mechanism
1: procedureA({Ui}ni=1, V shares, time horizon T )
2: for t = 1 . . . T do
3: for i = 1 . . . n do
4: Client i draws uit ∼ Ui
5: Client i picks request distributionQit = L
i
t(Hit, uit)
6: Client i draws rit ∼ Qit, and submits rit
7: end for
8: A computes an allocation St = A(r1t, . . . rnt, Ht)
9: A observes the executed shares vi(St) for each client
10: A updates the history: Ht+1 = Ht ∪ (rit, sit, vi(St))ni=1
11: end for
12: end procedure
A Preliminaries and Privacy Basics
Lemma 1 (Post Processing [DMNS06]). Let A : Xn → O be any (ǫ, δ)-differentially private
algorithm, and let f : O → O′ be any (possibly randomized) algorithm. Then the algorithm
f ◦A : Xn → O′ is also (ǫ, δ)-differentially private.
Post-processing implies that, for example, every decision process based on the output of a differen-
tially private algorithm is also differentially private.
Theorem 8 (Composition [DMNS06]). Let A1 : Xn → O, A2 : Xn → O′ be algorithms that
are (ǫ1, δ1)- and (ǫ2, δ2)-differentially private, respectively. Then the algorithm A : Xn → O ×O′
defined as A(r) = (A1(r), A2(r)) is (ǫ1 + ǫ2, δ1 + δ2)-differentially private. This holds even if A2
may be chosen as a function of the output of A1.
Lemma 2 (Billboard Lemma [HHR+14]). Let M : Xn → R be an (ǫ, δ)-differentially private
algorithm. Let A : Xn → On be any algorithm that can be decomposed as follows:
1. On input r, compute p = M(r).
2. Output fi(rit, p) to agent i, where fi : X ×R → O is an arbitrary function.
Then A is (ǫ, δ)-jointly differentially private.
B Proofs from Section 3
Proof of Theorem 1.
Proof. We first observe that the tail probabilities are monotonically decreasing in s for each client i:
Ti(s|ri) ≥ Ti(s′|ri) for all s ≤ s′. Therefore, by greedily allocating shares to clients in decreasing
order of Ti(s|ri), Greedy returns
S ∈ argmax
n∑
i=1
si∑
s=1
Ti(s|ri) s.t.
n∑
i=1
si = V
It remains to show that the expression above is equivalent to the expected number of units used. For
an arbitrary client i:
Eui∼Qi(u|ri)[min(si, ui)]
=
U∑
u=0
Qi(u|ri)min(si, u)
=
U∑
u=0
uQi(u|ri)1{u < si}+
U∑
u=0
siQi(u|ri)1{u ≥ si}
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=si−1∑
u=0
uQi(u|ri) +
U∑
u=si
siQi(u|ri)
=
si−1∑
u=0
uQi(u|ri) + siTi(si|ri)
=
si−2∑
u=0
uQi(u|ri) + (si − 1)Qi(si − 1|ri) + siTi(si|ri)
=
si−2∑
u=0
uQi(u|ri) + (si − 1)Qi(si − 1|ri) + Ti(si|ri) + (si − 1)(Ti(si − 1|ri)−Qi(si − 1|ri))
=
si−2∑
u=0
uQi(u|ri) + (si − 1)Ti(si − 1|ri) + Ti(si|ri)
Here, in the penultimate line, we use the fact that Ti(si|ri) = Ti(si− 1|ri)−Qi(si− 1|ri). Contin-
uing this manipulation inductively, we obtain that:
Eui∼Qi(u|ri)[min(si, ui)] =
si∑
s=1
Ti(s|ri).
Thus,
∑n
i=1
∑si
s=1 Ti(s|ri) =
∑
i EQi(u|ri)[min(si, ui)] = V (S), the expected payoff to the lender.
Proof of Theorem 2.
Proof. Recall the tail probabilities, Ti(s|ri) := Prui∼Q(u|ri)[u ≥ s] =
∑
s′≥sQi(s
′|ri), and con-
sider the set {Ti(si|ri)}ni=1 where si ranges from 1 to U . Let T(k) be the k-th order statistic of the
set {Ti(·|ri)}, where |{Ti(·|ri)}| = M , and let Ω := ∪V−1k=0 {T(M−k)}, the set of the V largest tail
probabilities among all clients for all s ≥ 1. The claim follows from observing that the allocation
strategy employed by the lender is equivalent to giving client i shares equal to the number of times
one of her tail probabilities appears in Ω, described below.
When a truthful client i requests ri shares, the tail probabilities of using s shares will be
T ∗i (s|ri) =
∑
s′≥s
Qi(s
′|ri) =
∑
s′≥s
1{s ≤ ui} = 1{s ≤ ui}
Let Ti(s|ri) denote the tail probabilities given a draw ri ∼ Qi(ri|ui) from an arbitrary strategy Qi.
Now fix any draw ri ∼ Qi(ri|ui) from Qi. Conditioned on ri, the number of shares allocated to
client i can be written as:
si|ri =
U∑
s=1
1{Ti(s|ri) ∈ Ω},
e.g. the number of tail probabilities of client i that are among the V largest. Then the utility
vi = min(ui, si) =
∑U
s=1 1{Ti(s|ri) ∈ Ω}1{1 ≤ s ≤ ui} =
∑ui
s=1 1{Ti(s|ri) ∈ A}. This of
course holds for the truthful strategy as well, and so it suffices to show that:
ui∑
s=1
1{T ∗i (s|ui) ∈ Ω} ≥
ui∑
s=1
1{Ti(s|ri) ∈ Ω}
This holds immediately, since ∀s ≤ ui, T ∗i (s|ui) = 1 ≥ Ti(s|ri), which implies
1{T ∗i (s|ui) ∈ Ω} ≥ 1{Ti(s|ri) ∈ Ω}. So we’ve shown that for any qi and ri ∼
Qi(ri|ui), vi(A(ri, r−i;Qi, Q−i))] ≤ vi(A(ui, r−i;QTi , Q−i)). Since this holds for any fixed ri,
it holds when we take the expectation over ri ∼ Qi(ri|ui), proving the claim.
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C Proofs and Definitions from Section 4
Algorithm 3 AUCTION Rule
Input: α > 0, n, {vi}i∈[n], U, V ⊲ valuations vi : [U ]→ [0, 1] satisfy DMR property
Output: feasible allocation S.
1: procedure AUCTION (α,U, V )
2: Initialize array S of length n, S[i]← 0, ∀i ⊲ S[i] counts the goods currently allocated to
player i
3: Initialize B← n, TB ← 0 ⊲ counts number of bids in current round, total bids respectively
4: Set the price p = 0,m = 1 ⊲ m is the index of the good currently being allocated
5: while B 6= 0 do ⊲ terminate if there are 0 bids in the round
6: B← 0
7: for i = 1 . . . n do
8: Let∆i = vi(S[i] + 1)− vi(S[i]) ⊲ marginal utility of additional good
9: if∆i ≥ p then
10: B← B+ 1, S[i]← S[i] + 1,m← m+ 1 ⊲ whenm = V + 1, setm = 1
11: S[im]← S[im]−1, where im is the player to which goodm is currently allocated
12: if TB (mod V ) = 0 then ⊲ increment the price every V bids
13: p← p+ α
14: end if
15: end if
16: end for
17: end while
18: return S
19: end procedure
Proof of Theorem 3.
Proof. We first show termination, then accuracy.
Termination: For every round that is not the final round, the total number of bids TB increases by at
least 1; otherwise, the algorithm would have terminated. Hence after every V such rounds, the price
increases by at least one increment of α. When p ≥ 1, no further bids are placed because ∆i ≤ 1
(∆i = vi(S[i]+1)−vi(S[i]) as in line 8 of AUCTION). This occurs after at most V/αmany rounds.
After the next round the algorithm necessarily terminates.
Accuracy: We will show that at termination, the price p∗ in conjunction with the valuation functions
{vi} form an approximate Walrasian equilibrium. For our purposes this will mean that:
1. The allocation S is feasible and all goods are allocated; i.e.
∑
i S[i] = V
2. Each player i receives her approximately most preferred allocation at the current price
level:
vi(S[i])− p∗S[i] ≥ (max
l∈[U ]
vi(l)− lp∗)− S[i]α
The first condition follows by construction and from the fact that vi ≥ 0; so, when the price is 0,
players will continue bidding until all goods are allocated, at which point the price is incremented
for the first time. Since the number of goods allocated is non-decreasing as the auction is run, this
is enough to conclude that
∑
i S[i] = V . The second condition forms the bulk of the proof and is
where the DMR property will be used in a critical way. But deferring that proof, let us see how this
implies the theorem statement. Let S′ be any feasible allocation. Then
vi(S[i])− p∗S[i] ≥ vi(S′[l])− S′[l]p∗)− S[i]α ∀i→
∑
i
vi(S[i])− p∗V ≥
∑
i
(vi(S
′[l])− S′[l]p∗)− V α =
∑
i
(vi(S
′[l]))−
∑
i
(S′[l]p∗)− V α
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SinceS′ is feasible,
∑
i(S
′[l]p∗) ≤ V p∗, and hence∑i vi(S[i])−p∗V ≥∑i(vi(S′[l]))−V p∗−V α,
which implies 1n
∑
i vi(S[i]) ≥ 1n
∑
i(vi(S
′[l])) − V αn . This holds for any allocation S′, and so it
holds for the optimal allocation, which proves the claim. So it suffices to show 2.
Fix a player i. Suppose that S[i] = 0. Then we need to show that 0 ≥ maxl∈[U ](vi(l) − lp∗). We
can rewrite this as: maxl∈[U ]
∑l
j=1(vi(j)−vi(j−1)−p∗), since canonically vi(0) = 0. Moreover,
since i declined to bid for 1 share at price p∗ (since the AUCTION has terminated) we know vi(1) =
vi(1)− vi(0)− p∗ < 0. But by the DMR property, this implies that vi(j)− vi(j − 1)− p∗ < 0, for
j ≥ 1. Hence 0 ≥ maxl∈[U ](vi(l)− lp∗) since for any value of l, each term in the sum on the RHS
is negative.
Now suppose S[i] > 0. Let pi be the price at which player i last bid. Let s˜ be the number of copies
of the good that player i had at that time. Because i has not gained any shares since her last bid,
s˜ ≥ S[i]− 1. First we observe that pi ≥ p∗ − α, since the price only increments every V bids, and
in that time, all of the goods are re-allocated to a new player. Since S[i] > 0, player i must have
bid and received a good at some point during the last V bids, which means the price can only have
incremented at most once. Suppose now that l > S[i]. Since i did not bid at price p∗, we know that
vi(S[i] + 1)− vi(S[i]) < p∗. By DMR, this means that for all j ≥ S[i] + 1, vi(j)− vi(j − 1) < p∗.
Thus vi(l)− vi(S[i]) =
∑l
j=S[i]+1 vi(j)− vi(j − 1) ≤ (l− S[i])p∗, which rearranging shows that
vi(l)− p∗l ≤ vi(S[i])− p∗S[i], which satisfies condition 2. Now consider the case where l < S[i].
We know that at price pi ≥ p∗ − α, with s˜ ≥ S[i] − 1 copies of the good, player i bid for an
additional share.
Lemma 3. Monotonicity of Valuations. Suppose that player i with s copies of the good bids for an
additional good at price p. Let j ≤ t ≤ s+ 1. Then vi(t)− tp ≥ (vi(j)− jp).
Proof. Player i bids at price p, and so we know that vi(s+ 1)− vi(s) ≥ p. By the DMR property,
this means that vi(k+1)− vi(k) ≥ p, for k ≤ s. Since vi(t)− vi(j) =
∑t
k=j+1 vi(k)− vi(k− 1),
this shows that vi(t)− vi(j) ≥ p(t− j). Rearranging proves the lemma.
By Lemma 3, and the fact that S[i] ≤ s˜ + 1, this means that vi(S[i]) − S[i]pi ≥ vi(l) − lpi.
Rearranging, and using that pi ≥ p∗ − α, this shows that vi(S[i]) − p∗S[i] − (vi(l) − p∗l) ≥
−(S[i]− l)α ≥ −S[i]α, since l ≤ S[i]. This proves the claim.
D Proofs and Definitions from Section 4.2
Given a stream of bits (which in our case will represent “bids”) b = (b1, b2, . . . bT ) ∈ {0, 1}T , a
streaming counter C(b) releases an approximationC(b)[t] to sb(t) =
∑t
i=1 bi at every time step t.
Definition 4. [CSS11] A streaming counter C is (α, β) useful if with probability at least 1− β, for
each t ∈ [T ],
|C(b)[t]− sb(t)| ≤ α
We will denote by Cǫ(T ) the Binary mechanism of [CSS11], instantiated with parameter ǫ and time
horizon T .
Theorem 9. [CSS11] For β > 0, and any sequence b, Cǫ(T ) is ǫ-differentially private with respect
to a change in a single entry of the stream b and (α, β)-useful for
α =
2
√
2 log(1/β) log(T )5/2
ǫ
Proof of Theorem 4.
Proof. Accuracy analysis: Algorithm PRIVAUC potentially loses welfare (as compared to the allo-
cation computed by its non private variant) in three ways:
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Algorithm 4 PRIVAUC
Input: α > 0, n, {vi}i∈[n], U, V, ǫ, ρ ⊲ valuations vi : [U ]→ [0, 1] satisfy DMR property
Output: Allocation S = {si}
1: procedure PRIVAUC (α,U, V, ǫ, ρ)
2: Set T = 2Vαρn
3: For each i, let Si be the set of shares allocated to i. Initialize Si = ∅
4: For s ∈ Si, let s[count] counts the number of shares allocated since i received s
5: Initialize private counter Cǫ′(nT )
6: Let ǫ′ = ǫ(αρn)V
7: Set roundb = n, E =
2
√
2 log(1/β) log(nT )5/2
ǫ′ ⊲ noisy round bid count, error of Cǫ(nT )
8: Set V ′ = V − 2E ⊲We leave some slack in the supply V ′ so that our allocation is always
feasible
9: while roundb > ρn− 2E and t ≤ T do ⊲ terminate if there are 0 bids in the round
10: for i = 1 . . . n do
11: p = α⌊Cǫ′ [t]V ′ ⌋ ⊲ estimate the current price
12: ∆ = Cǫ′ [t]− Cǫ′ [t− n] ⊲ estimate the number of shares allocated since last bid
13: for shares s ∈ Si do
14: update s[count]← s[count] + ∆
15: if s[count] ≥ V ′ then
16: S ← S\{s}
17: end if
18: end for
19: Set bi = 0 ⊲ bi is the indicator if i bids
20: if vi(|Si|+ 1)− vi(|Si|) ≥ p then
21: S ← S ∪ {s}
22: Initialize s[count] = 0
23: Feed bi to Cǫ′(nT )
24: end if
25: t← t+ 1
26: end for
27: roundb ← Cǫ′ [t]− Cǫ′ [t− n] ⊲ noisy count of bids in the round
28: end while
29: return S = {|Si|}
30: end procedure
1. To ensure a feasible allocation, the auction only tries to allocate supply V − 2E and might
potentially allocate only V − 4E shares.
2. The auction stops after the first round in which fewer than ρn players bid, rather than
continuing to termination.
3. Prices and allocations are computed with respect to a noisy estimate of bid counts, rather
than with respect to exact counts.
We handle the first source of error with the following three lemmata.
Lemma 4. Assume that all valuation functions vi have the DMR property. Then OPTV−E ≥
(1 − E/V )OPTV .
Proof. Consider the optimal allocation of V shares, SV . The welfare of SV can be written as
the sum over all V shares of the marginal value of allocating that share. I.e. for each player i
assigned si shares: vi(si) =
∑si
j=1(vi(j)− vi(j − 1)), and the welfare of SV , OPTV = w(Sv) =∑
i vi(si) =
∑
i
∑si
j=1(vi(j) − vi(j − 1)). Now consider the E shares with the lowest marginal
values, and write SE to denote the allocation of these E shares. By the DMR property, there exists
a feasible allocation SV−E of V − E shares respectively such that SV = SV−E + SE . Then,
w(SV ) = w(SV−E) + w(SE) ≤ OPTV−E + w(SE) → OPTV−E ≥ w(SV ) − w(SE) =
14
w(SV )(1−w(SE)/w(SV )). Since by definition w(SE) is the sum of the E lowest marginal values
of the shares V in the allocation SV , w(SE)/w(SV ) ≤ E/V , which proves the claim.
Lemma 5 (Feasibility.). With probability at least 1−β, if S is the allocation returned by PRIVAUC,
|S| = ∑ si ≤ V .
Proof. With probability 1− β, we know that the error of the private bid counting sequence Cǫ′(nT )
is less than E for every time step:
sup
t=1...nT
|Cǫ′ [t]− sb[t]| ≤ E, (2)
where again sb[t] denots the true (non-noisy) bid count at time t.
We claim then that if (2) holds, then for every allocated share s allocated to any client i at any time
t, the error in s[count], which counts the number of bids since s was allocated, is at most 2E. We
first write s[count] = Cǫ[t]−Cǫ[t− ri], where r is the number of rounds since s was allocated. The
error of s[count] is:
s[count]− sb[t]− sb[t− ri] ≤ |Cǫ[t]− sb[t]|+ |Cǫ[t− ri]− sb[t− ri]| ≤ 2E
Now consider the time at termination T ∗, and let t∗ < T ∗ denote the time at which the V th last bid
was made. For any share s allocated at any time t < t∗, at T ∗ there have been greater than V shares
allocated since s was allocated. Hence, s[count] ≥ V − 2E = V ′. Since a share is unallocated
whenever its estimate of the bids placed since it was allocated, s[count], exceeds V ′, we know that
shares allocated prior to the last V bids have all been unallocated by T ∗. Thus, the number of shares
allocated at termination is upper bounded by V .
Lemma 6 (Approximate Clearing). With probability at least 1 − β, if S is the allocation returned
by PRIVAUC, |S| = ∑ si ≥ V − 4E.
Proof. Again let T ∗ be the time at termination, and note that (2) holds with probability at least 1−β.
We first show that the total number of bids, sb[T
∗] ≥ V − 3E. This is clear, because for the first
t = 1 . . . V − 3E rounds, the counter Cǫ[t] ≤ V − 3E +E = V ′, and hence p = 0. At p = 0 every
player i bids. Hence, since sb[T ] ≥ V −3E, we can consider the last V −4E bids over the course of
the auction. By definition, the true number of bids that have been submitted since any of these shares
has been allocated is less than V − 4E. Moreover, for each of these allocated shares s the error of
s[count] is less than 2E. And so, at T ∗, s[count] ≤ V − 3E + 2E = V ′; therefore, none of these
shares have been unallocated. Thus, there are at least V − 4E shares allocated at termination.
Let p∗ = α⌊C′ǫ[T∗]V ′ ⌋ denote the price at termination. We say that a client i is unsatisfied if at T ∗,
client i would still bid; e.g. if vi(Si + 1)− vi(Si) ≥ p∗. Then, we claim that under (2) at T ∗ there
are at most ρn unsatisfied clients:
• If the algorithm terminates early, then roundb < ρn − 2E, which means that the number
of bids in the last round, sb[T
∗]− sb[T ∗ − n] is at most ρn.
• If the algorithm does not terminate early, then after T rounds, there have been at least
ρn−4E bids per round, for a total of T (ρn−4E) bids. Thus, the price is at least αT (ρn−4E)V .
By assumption, E ≤ ρn/8, substituting T = 2Vαρn shows that the price is ≥ 1, and there
are no bidders.
We now show that under the allocation S, each satisfied player receives her approximately most
preferred bundle at the current price level. If I∗ denotes the at least (1 − ρ) fraction of satisfied
bidders at termination, then for i ∈ I∗ we show:
vi(S[i])− p∗S[i] ≥ max
l∈[U ]
vi(l)− p∗S[i]− S[i](2α) (3)
This is very similar to the argument used to show optimality of the non-private ascending price
auction. If S[i] = 0 the statement holds trivially, because the fact that i has chosen not to bid at
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price p∗ means all the bundles on the right hand side have negative value, by the DMR property.
So, suppose that S[i] > 0. Let pi be the price at which player i last bid. Again, whenever V bids
go by, since the error of the counter is less than E, every share must have been reallocated. Since
S[i] > 0, this means i last bid within the last V bids, which in turn means that the counter could have
incremented by at most V + E counts since i last bid. In turn, this means that the price could have
gone up by at most α + ⌈EV ⌉α ≤ 2α. So pi ≥ p∗ − 2α. Following an identical chain of reasoning
as in the proof of Theorem 3, we recover Equation 3. Now let S′ be any other feasible allocation of
V ′ shares. Then
vi(S[i])− p∗S[i] ≥ vi(S′[l])− S′[l]p∗)− S[i]2α ∀i ∈ I∗ →
(1 − ρ)n+
∑
i∈S∗
vi(S[i])−
∑
i
S[i]p∗ ≥
n∑
i=1
(vi(S
′[l])− S′[l](p∗ + 2α))
where the second line follows since vi ≤ 1. Since S′ is feasible,
∑
i(S
′[l]p∗) ≤ V ′p∗. Moreover,
since at least V − 4E shares are allocated at termination,
ρn+
∑
i∈S∗
vi(S[i])−(V −4E)p∗ ≥ ρn+
∑
i∈S∗
vi(S[i])−
∑
i
S[i]p∗ ≥
n∑
i=1
(vi(S
′[l]))−V ′(p∗+2α))
Rearranging, and using p∗ ≤ 1, this shows that:
v(S) ≥ v(S′)− ρ− 2(1− 2α)E + 2αV
n
Since this holds for any allocation S′, it certainly holds for the optimal allocation. Thus, v(S) ≥
OPTV−2E − (1− ρ)− 2(1−2α)E+2αVn , which by Lemma 4, means
v(S) ≥ (1− 2E/V )OPTV − (1 − ρ)− 2(1− 2α)E + 2αV
n
The result then follows from the numbered conditions in the theorem statement.
Privacy Analysis: With probability 1− β over the randomness in the private bid counter, there are
at least ρn − 4E bids at every round of the algorithm. Moreover, after the noisy price is 1, there
are no bids. Hence, after Vα + E total bids, the noisy counter reaches
V
α , and bidding ends. Thus,
with probability 1 − β there are at most Vα+Eρn−4E rounds, which means that each player bids at most
that many times. Thus, the sensitivity of the counter is
V
α+E
ρn−4E . Since we take α ≤ Vρn (Condition
1),
V
α+E
ρn−4E ≤ 2Vαρn . Hence, with probability 1− β, setting ǫ′ = ǫ2V
αρn
guarantees ǫ differential privacy
[CSS11]. Since this only happenswith probability 1−β, this guarantees thatCǫ′(nT ) satisfies (ǫ, β)-
differential privacy. Since each individual allocation Si is computed purely as a function ofCǫ′(nT ),
by the billboard lemma, PRIVAUC achieves (β, ǫ)-JDP. We remark that if we are concerned with
achieving the stronger (ǫ, 0)-JDP, then instead of concluding that with high probability no client
bids more than
V/α+E
ρn−4E many times, we could instead modify PRIVAUC in such a way that after
a client bids
V/α+E
ρn−4E many times, they automatically stop bidding. In this case, the sensitivity of
the bid counter with respect to any client will always be bounded by
V/α+E
ρn−4E , and the counter of
[CSS11] achieves (ǫ, 0) differential privacy, which implies that PRIVAUC achieves (ǫ, 0)-JDP by
Lemma 2. We note that our accuracy statement will be unchanged, since in the analysis we are
already conditioning on the fact that the error is bounded by E, whereby no client exceeds V/α+Eρn−4E
bids.
Proof of Theorem 5.
Proof. We first condition on the private trajectory of bids Cǫ′(nT ), which induces a private tra-
jectory of prices ~p. Then, given the trajectory of prices, the client utilities viA(·) are deterministic
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quantities. We claim that for all ~p, viA(Q
T |~p) ≥ viA(Qi|~p). The claim will follow from the fact
that, given any fixed trajectory ~p, we imagine running two versions of PRIVAUC, one where client
i reports Qi(r|ui) and the other where client i reports QT . Then, restricting our attention to the
shares s that i has at termination, we will show that in any round in the Qi auction where s was
acquired, s was also acquired in the QT auction. Hence, the QT auction results in at least as many
shares at termination as the Qi auction, which since the client utility is monotonically increasing in
the number of shares si, shows the claim.
In the next paragraph we stop explicitly writing the conditioning on ~p and assume a fixed sequence
of prices. Then, we analyze 2 cases:
1. The final price p∗ at termination is ≤ 1.
2. The final price p∗ at termination 1 + α
Case 1: Assume that i is one of the (1 − ρ)n fraction of bidders who is satisfied at p∗. Then, it is
immediately clear that if ~p falls into case 1, then viA(Q
T ) = ui. This follows from the fact that the
marginal value under QT of every additional share is 1 up until share ui + 1, and so if the price is
≤ 1, client i will bid until she has at least s = ui shares. Since this maximizes her realized payoff
functionmin(ui, s), in case 1 we have v
i
A(Q
T |~p) ≥ viA(Qi|~p).
Case 2: We first note that since we have drawn ui, ri, this implies that Qi(ri|ui) > 0, Qi(ui) >
0, Qi(ri) > 0, and hence Qi(ui|ri) = Qi(ri|ui)Qi(ui)Qi(ri) > 0. Thus, under Qi the marginal value of
the jth share, Prui∼Qi(u|ri)[ui ≥ j], is less than 1 for j > u. Then, as we have used repeatedly,
any share s that client i holds at termination must have been acquired at a price pi ≥ p∗ − α = 1,
since the price increments by α after only V ′ ticks of the noisy counter. But, since the marginal
value of every share beyond the uth is strictly less than 1, any share s held at termination in the Qi
auction was acquired when client i had strictly less than ui shares. Consider the time t at which s
was required, only now consider the QT auction. There are only two possibilities: if i holds ≤ ui
shares at time t, then i will also acquire share s. In either case, client i in the QT auction holds at
least as many shares as client i in the Qi auction after time t, and so this holds at t = T
∗, which
proves the claim.
So we have shown that, given a fixed price trajectory ~p, if client i is satisfied at termination,
viA(Q
T |~p) ≥ viA(Qi|~p).
We claim that for at least (1 −√β + (1− β)ρ)n clients i, the probability that i is unsatisfied at
termination is less than
√
β + (1− β)ρ. This is clear because we know that if the error of the pri-
vate counter does not exceed E, which happens with probability (1− β), the number of unsatisfied
clients at termination is less than ρn. Since the number of unsatisfied bidders cannot exceed n, this
implies the expected number of unsatisfied bidders is bounded by (β+(1− β)ρ)n. But, if for more
than
√
β + (1− β)ρ clients, the probability of being unsatisfied exceeded √β + (1 − β)ρ, the
expected number of unsatisfied bidders would exceed (β + (1− β)ρ)n, which is a contradiction.
Let i be one such client, and let I be the indicator that i is satisfied at termination. Now:
viA(Q
T ) = E(I,~p)∼PRIVAUC(QT )[v
i
A(Q
T )|~p, I] ≥ e−ǫE(I,~p)∼PRIVAUC(Qi)[viA(Qi)|~p, I] =
e−ǫ
∫
~p
viA(Qi|~p, I = 1)Pr[~p, I = 1] + viA(Qi|~p, I = 0)Pr[I = 0, p] ≥
e−ǫ
∫
~p
viA(Qi|~p, I = 1)Pr[~p, I = 1] = e−ǫ Pr[I = 1]viA(Qi|I = 1)
Finally, since Pr[I = 1] ≥ 1 −√β + (1 − β)ρ,Pr[I = 1]Pr[I = 1]viA(Qi|I = 1) ≥ e−ǫ Pr[I =
1]viA(Qi)− e−ǫ
√
β+(1−β)ρ
1−
√
β+(1−β)ρ .
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E Proofs from Section 5.
Algorithm 5 Greedy Mechanism
1: procedureA(Utility distributions Ui for n clients, V shares to allocate at each of T rounds)
2: for t = 1 . . . T do
3: for i = 1 . . . n do
4: Client i draws uit ∼ Ui
5: Client i picks request distributionQit = L
i
t(Hit, uit)
6: Client i draws rit ∼ Qit, and submits rit
7: end for
8: A updates its estimates Qˆi(rit) = 1rit
9: A computes an allocation St = A(Qˆ1(r1t), . . . Qˆt(rnt))
10: A observes the executed shares vi(St) for each client
11: A updates its estimates of the conditionals Qˆi(rit)
12: A updates the history: Ht+1 = Ht ∪ (rit, sit, vi(St))ni=1
13: end for
14: end procedure
Algorithm 6 Greedy Private Mechanism
1: procedure A(Utility distributions Ui ∈ ∆([U ]) for n clients, V shares to allocate at each of T
rounds, PRIVAUC, ǫ, α)
2: for t = 1 . . . T do
3: for i = 1 . . . n do
4: Client i draws uit ∼ Ui
5: Client i picks request distributionQit = L
i
t(Hit, uit)
6: Client i draws rit ∼ Qit, and submits rit
7: end for
8: A updates its estimates Qˆi(rit) = 1rit
9: A computes an allocation St = PRIVAUC(Qˆ1(r1t), . . . Qˆt(rnt), ǫ, α)
10: A observes the executed shares vi(St) for each client
11: A updates its estimates of the conditionals Qˆi(rit)
12: A updates the history: Ht+1 = Ht ∪ (rit, sit, vi(St))ni=1
13: end for
14: end procedure
Proof of Theorem 6.
Proof. The crux of the proof relies on the fact that once we have fixed the request distributions
Q−it at each round of all other players, and given that Algorithm 0 assumes the clients are truthful,
requesting truthfully is an approximately dominant strategy for most of the clients by Theorem 5.
Formally, by Theorem 5, fixing Q−it, in any fixed round the truthfulness guarantee applies to a
1 − β2/T fraction of the clients i. Hence over all T rounds it applies to a 1 − β2 fraction of the
clients. This implies that over the random draw of Q−it, for at least 1 − β fraction of clients, the
probability of the truthfulness guarantee holding in every round is ≥ 1− β. Else, the expectation of
the total number of unsatisfied clients over all T rounds would be strictly greater than βn ·β = β2n,
which contradicts the fact that with probability 1 it is ≤ β2n by Theorem 5. Let i be one such client.
We will also require the fact that underLti or underL
t
i∗ any given realization ofQ−it is equally likely.
We first observe that the outputs of the mechanism to each client are only a function of the estimated
distributions Qˆi(rit) which is the only dependence the allocations have on the strategies. Hence
privacy in the Qˆi(rit) guarantees privacy in the L
t
i. In the case where Qˆi(rit) = 1rit , the overall
procedure is (ǫ, β)-JDP, whereas if the estimation procedure uses data from all of the rounds we have
to use the composition rule for differential privacy to get an overall O˜(
√
Tǫ, βT ) privacy guarantee.
Then since the overall mechanism is (ǫ, β)-JDP in the strategies Lti, the client distributions at each
round Q−it, which are a post-processing of the outputs of the mechanism to all of the other clients,
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are an (ǫ, β)-joint differentially private function of Lti. We are now equipped to show the main
result:
vi(L
1
i , . . . , L
n
i ) =
∫
Q−it∈∆([U ])(n−1)T
T∑
t=1
E[vi(St)|Q−it, (Lti)] Pr[Q−it|(Lti)]
By the argument above, we also know that there exists a subset Ω ⊂ ∆([U ])(n−1)T such that
Pr[Q−it ∈ Ω] ≥ 1− β and for all Q−it ∈ Ω, client i is approximately truthful. Hence:
vi(L
1
i , . . . , L
n
i ) ≤
∫
Q−it∈Ω
T∑
t=1
E[vi(St)|Q−it, (Lti)] Pr[Q−it|(Lti)] + βUT
Moreover, by Theorem 5 forQ−it ∈ Ω,E[vi(St)|Q−it, (Lti)] ≤ eǫE[vi(St)|Q−it, (Lti∗)] + β
2/T
1−β2/T ,
and by (ǫ, β)-JDP Pr[Q−it|(Lti)] ≤ eǫ Pr[Q−it|(Lti∗)] + β. Substituting both of these inequalities
into the above equation gives:
vi(L
1
i , . . . , L
n
i ) ≤ e2ǫ
∫
Q−it∈Ω
T∑
t=1
E[vi(St)|Q−it, (Lti∗)] Pr[Q−it|(Lti∗)] + 2βUT + eǫ
β2
1− β2/T ,
Giving:
vi(L
1
i , . . . , L
n
i ) ≤ e2ǫvi(L1i , . . . , Lni ) + 2βUT + eǫ
β2
1− β2/T ,
as desired.
Sketch of the Naive Learning Mechanism.
1. Taking τ ≈ 1nU , after ≈ T/τ = poly(n, U, T ) rounds, for any r ∈ [U ], i ∈ [n] such that
Qi(ri) > τ , we will have observed≈ T draws from the conditional distributionQi(ui|ri).
2. Hence, after a polynomial number of rounds, we can learn each conditionalQi(ui|ri) arbi-
trarily well for any i, ri such that Qi(ri) > τ .
3. The lender uses the observed samples to compute estimates Qˆi(u|ri) for every i, ri, and
upon observing a draw ~r = (r1, r2, . . . rn) ∼ Q, uses Greedy to compute the optimal
allocation with respect to these Qˆi.
4. A union bound shows that with high probability for every ri = ~ri, Qi(ri) > τ , and hence
we have a good estimate of each of the conditional distributions.
5. Standard Chernoff bounds characterize the sample complexity of learning and show that
the optimal allocation with respect to Qˆi is approximately optimal with respect to the true
distributionsQi.
Note that we may view the “learning” phase as a means by which the clients can communicate
distributions Qˆi to the lender. We note that (so long as the lender observes each report ri at least
once in the learning phase), if client i is reporting truthfully, we will have Qˆi = Q
T
i , the truthful
reporting distribution. Since it is a dominant strategy to report QT even when the client has the
ability to report any distribution, since QTi is possible for the client to report through this more
restricted learning interface, truthful reporting remains a dominant strategy.
Example 1. Consider the case of V = 1, n = 2 clients over T = 100 rounds, where both clients
have demands fixed at 1 share in every round. Further, suppose client 1 has the following strategy: if
client 1 receives a share in the first round, she will not request any more shares for the subsequent 99
rounds. If she does not receive a share, she will play truthfully for the rest of the rounds, requesting
1 share at each round. In this game the dominant strategy for client 2 is to request 0 shares in the
first round and then be guaranteed a payoff of 99 shares over the subsequent rounds, as opposed to
playing truthfully at all rounds, which if ties are broken randomly gets her 50 shares in expectation.
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